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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

pollutant from a point source into waters of the United States. The
appellate court focused on the fact that the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") had not articulated a clear interpretation of current
law dealing with whether pesticides used properly and released over or
into waters of the United States triggered the requirement of an
NPDES or SPDES permit. It determined that the question would
remain open until the EPA decided the issue.
The district court acted with an incomplete record and failed to
consider threshold questions of law. The court suggested that the
Altmans amend their complaint to join federal and state agencies
necessary to resolve this issue. The appellate court also issued five
guidelines for the district court. First, the district court needed to
consider whether freshwater wetlands in New York are "waters of the
United States." Second, the district court should examine whether the
use of the particular pesticides in this case constituted the "deliberate
discharge" of pollutants into the waters of the United States. Third,
the district court must determine if Amherst properly used the
pesticides for their intended purpose. Fourth, the district court
needed to determine whether any of the pesticides applied,
discharged, or sprayed by Amherst were pollutants as defined by the
CWA. Fifth, the district court must use persuasive authority of recent
case law from the United States Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit.
Adriano Martinez

FOURTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., 39 Fed. Appx. 870 (4th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a Supreme Court decision subsequent to a plea
agreement and consent decree entered into by appellants and the
United States did not eliminate the federal government's jurisdiction
and did not legalize the conduct underlying appellant's criminal
conviction because the decision dealt with a provision of 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a) (3) that the government had not used to assertjurisdiction for
the plea agreement or the consent decree).
This appeal arose out of a denial by the Maryland United States
District Court of Interstate General Company's ("IGC") petition for
writ of error coram nobis and motion to vacate. As grounds for its writ
and motion to vacate, IGC argued the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC') legalized the conduct underlying
IGC's criminal conviction. Thus, appellants claimed they did not
violate the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by filling in certain wetlands
because SWANCC eliminated the federal government's jurisdiction
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over those wetlands. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
disagreed, affirming the district court's ruling and holding SWANCC
did not change the decisional law applicable to appellant's case.
In September 1995, the United States began parallel criminal and
civil proceedings against IGC, St. Charles Associates ("SCA"), and
James J. Wilson, chief executive officer of both companies ("IGC and
SCA"). The complaints charged IGC and SCA with violating the CWA
by discharging fill material onto four parcels of wetlands in St. Charles
without obtaining a permit from the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps"). In February 1996, ajury convicted the IGC and
SCA on four felony counts of knowingly discharging fill material into
wetlands protected by the CWA.
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed IGC's convictions and
remanded the matter for a new trial because the district court, in
instructing the jury, had relied on 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (3) as a possible
basis for the Corps' jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Corps
had exceeded its congressional authorization under the CWA in
promulgating § 328.3(a)(3).
Consequently, the court held
§ 328.3(a) (3) was invalid and the district court's instruction based on
that regulation was erroneous.
After remand, the parties settled both the criminal and civil aspects
of the controversy. IGC pled guilty to a single felony count and paid
$1.5 million in fines. The parties also signed a consent decree, which
required IGC to pay a civil penalty of $400,000 and to implement a
wetland remediation plan. In return, the government dismissed all
charges against Wilson and SCA. The district court sentenced IGC
and entered the consent decree in November 1999.
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court decided SWANCC, and IGC
filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis and a motion to vacate
the consent decree under Rule 60(b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court denied both applications, and IGC
appealed.
Federal courts have the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) to grant a
writ of error coram nobis vacating a conviction after completion of a
sentence. However, this extraordinary relief should be granted only if
an error "of the most fundamental character" has occurred, and no
other remedy is available. Although historically, this common law writ
was used to correct fundamental errors of fact, it may also be issued to
correct fundamental errors of law. Such an error may occur when
there is a significant change in the law following a conviction.
As with coram nobis, a threshold question under Rule 60(b) (5) is
whether there has been a significant change in the law since the
conviction in question. It is appropriate for a court to grant a Rule
60(b) (5) motion if the court is convinced that its prior decision was
clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. According to
the Supreme Court, this may occur when the party seeking relief from
an injunction or consent decree can show a significant change either
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in factual conditions or in law. Here, IGC argued that SWANCC
significantly changed the law applicable to its conduct.
The Fourth Circuit held that both IGC's guilty plea and the
consent decree assumed that the Corps had jurisdiction under the
CWA to regulate the St. Charles wetlands. The court next noted,
however, that the Corps no longer asserted jurisdiction under
§ 328.3(a) (3) because United States v. Wilson declared that subsection
of the regulation invalid. Instead, the court opined, the Corps
asserted jurisdiction over the wetlands because they were adjacent to
tributaries of traditional navigable waters. It noted that the parties
acknowledged the factual predicate for the Corps' jurisdictionspecifically, that the St. Charles wetlands were adjacent to tributaries of
traditionally navigable waters.
IGC argued that SWANCC eliminated jurisdiction over wetlands
adjacent to waters that were not traditionally navigable, even if those
waters eventually flowed into traditional navigable waters. According
to IGC, SWANCC limited the Corps' jurisdiction to: (1) traditional
navigable waters; and (2) wetlands immediately adjacent to traditional
navigable waters. Consequently, IGC argued that SWANCC eliminated
the Corps' jurisdiction over the disputed wetlands, so discharging fill
into them without a permit did not violate section 404(a) of the CWA.
The Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by IGC's contentions,
holding the only clear change in law made by SWANCC was a narrow
one. At issue in SWANCC was the Corps' jurisdiction over an isolated
intrastate body of water. The court further held that the Corps' in
SWANCC based its jurisdiction solely on § 328.3(a)(3), the only
subsection covering isolated bodies of water. Thus, the Supreme
Court declined to hold that isolated ponds wholly located within two
Illinois counties fell under section 404(a)'s definition of "navigable
waters" because they served as habitat for migratory birds.
The Fourth Circuit noted that the wetlands at issue were adjacent
to the headwaters of small streams that flowed into Port Tobacco
Creek, Piney Branch, or Mattawoman Creek, and concluded these
wetlands were adjacent to tributaries of traditional navigable waters.
In sum, because the Fourth Circuit had already invalidated
§ 328.3(a) (3) in its entirety in United States v. Wilson, an opinion issued
before either the plea or the consent decree, SWANCC effected no
Accordingly,
relevant change in decisional law in this circuit.
(3) and, in
of
§
328.3(a)
validity
only
the
SWANCCs holding addressed
the present case, the Corps' jurisdiction did not rest on subsection
(a) (3). Rather, the Fourth Circuit opined, the Corps' based its
jurisdiction on §§ 328.3(a) (1), (a) (5), and (a) (7) for purposes of the
guilty plea and the consent decree.
In denying IGC's writ of error coram nobis and motion to vacate, the
Fourth Circuit stated that IGC would have had to show there had been
a fundamental or significant change in the law governing the subject
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case. IGC failed to do so. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order denying IGC's petition for writ of error coram
nobis and motion to vacate the consent decree.
Gloria M. Soto
SIXTH CIRCUIT
Hamilton v. Myers, 281 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that
individuals rightfully possessing prior property interests in lakes, now
held in public trust, own the submerged land beneath the lake and the
air above, to the low water mark point, as measured at the time the
lake transferred into public trust).
Jamie and Bonnie Hamilton ("Hamilton") filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee against the
Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, its executive director, and
several employees in their official and individual capacities ("TWRA").
Hamilton sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the TWRA,
and compensatory and punitive damages against the employees, in
their individual capacities. Hamilton alleged that TWRA and its
employees violated Hamilton's due process rights by unlawfully
searching and seizing Hamilton's boat, duck blind, and decoys from
Reelfoot Lake at the orders of the TWRA regional office. Additionally,
Hamilton sought declaratory relief pronouncing that Hamilton owned
a property interest in Reelfoot Lake. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of TWRA, finding sovereign immunity
barred Hamilton's claims, and that in the alternative, Hamilton did
not own a property interest in Reelfoot Lake because the lake was held
in public trust. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling
that the employees in their individual capacities were immune from
suit because the employees' actions were reasonable and protected as a
discretionary function. However, the court reversed the district court's
judgment on the other claims. It held that Hamilton owned a
property interest in Reelfoot Lake under Tennessee law, and
remanded the case to determine whether the Hamiltons had standing
to enforce their property rights, and to resolve disputed issues
regarding the measurement of the property interest.
In 1788, the State of North Carolina granted Colonel Doherty,
Hamilton's predecessor in interest, a deed of real property. In 1810,
an earthquake caused the formation of Reelfoot Lake, thus
submerging part of the land included under the original 1788 grant.
Hamilton's deed extended to the ordinary low water mark of Reelfoot
Lake. Since the Doherty grant included the entire portion of land
described in the original 1788 deed, Hamilton asserted Doherty's
riparian rights over the lakebed, 200 yards past the shore of the Lake,

